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Inter-American Economic Cooperation in
the 1980's: The Need for a New U.S.
Strategy
Ambassador Abelardo L. Valdez*
Progress in economic and social development by developing countries should
not spell the end of US. bilateral assistance, argues Ambassador Valdez in
this article. In recent years such progress has occurred in Latin America
and the Caribbean to the extent that many of the nations of the region no
longer qualify for assistance under theper capita income criterion tradition-
ally employed by U.S. policy-makers. Ambassador Valdez explores the
needfor continuing bilateral assistance, and then articulates why it is in the
best interests of the United States to provide this assistance. He concludes
by setting out the parameters of aforeign aidpolicy structured in light of the
changing concerns of "middle income" developing nations, as well as the
United States.
I would call it the "zero hour." We still do not have sufficient re-
sources; we still do not have sufficient plans. We have great accumu-
lated needs and expectations. And the modem world is not made for
these kinds of countries. It is made for strong nations, for their
strength, and in some way ... it has made some structures for help-
ing very poor countries. But it is not made for middle countries that
do not fit in....
-Jose Lopez Portillo,l
President of Mexico
In recent years, the United States Agency for International Devel-
opment (AID), the agency primarily responsible for the administration
* United States Chief of Protocol; former Ass't Administrator, Bureau for Latin America and
the Caribbean, Agency for International Development; B.S., 1965, Texas A. & M.; J.D., 1970,
Baylor University; LL.M., 1974, Harvard University.
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions to this article of Dennis Foreman, Judd
Kessler, Paul Liebenson, John Sanbrailo, Barbara Upton, and Clarence Zuvekas, Jr.
1 Interview with Jose Lopez Portillo, President of Mexico, UPI (1978).
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of the U.S. bilateral foreign economic assistance program, has reduced
or terminated foreign aid to less developed countries (LDC's) that have
been classified as "middle-income" countries and has directed develop-
ment assistance mainly towards the poorest countries of the developing
world. Deferring for the moment the definitional problems attending
the term "middle-income," it should be observed that in distinguishing
between low-income and middle-income developing countries the
United States generally has used the same per capita income criterion3
that the World Bank utilizes to determine eligibility for the Interna-
tional Development Association (IDA). More than thirty five
LCD's-including all but four Latin American countries-have per
capita incomes greater than $580, the figure used by the IDA, and thus
are classified as middle-income countries.
The trend of reducing aid to middle-income countries has caused
concern among a growing number of U.S. development assistance
policymakers. 6 There is a special concern that the United States is los-
ing its ability to relate bilaterally to the major development problems of
its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere.
7
2 International Development and Food Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-424, 92 Stat.
937 (1978) (to be codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). Although there was an increase in
bilateral economic assistance for the poorest populations of the Third World in 1979, overall fund-
ing declined by $46,450,000 from 1978 levels, to $3,736,850,000. H.R. REP. No. 1087, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1978) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT].
3 See, eg., Foreign Assistance and Related Programs Appropriations Act of 1979, Pub. L.
No. 95-481, 92 Stat. 1591 (1978) (to be codified in scattered sections of 22 U.S.C.). Loans to
countries with per capita income greater than $550 but less than $900 are repayable within 25
years, whereas loans to countries with per capita incomes greater than $900 are repayable within
20 years. Id
4 The International Development Association, founded in 1960, is an affiliate of the World
Bank. Its purpose is to make loans available on "softer" (more concessionary) terms than can be
obtained from the World Bank. IDA loans are available only to IDA member countries. Eligibil-
ity for IDA funds is determined on the basis of per capita income. Recently, the World Bank has
been revising IDA per capita income criteria yearly to take account of inflation and real economic
growth. The figure distinguishing between low-income countries and middle-income countries
was $520 in 1976, and $580 in 1977.
Although governmental, public, and private entities in the developing world can borrow, in
practice IDA loans have been made to governments. Historically, the largest portion of IDA
funds has gone to India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, with the smallest amount of IDA loans being
extended to Latin America and Caribbean countries, whose per capita income levels have gener-
ally disqualified them from IDA funding. These countries in Latin America and the Caribbean
have been able to secure large amounts of loans from the World Bank, at less favorable terms.
THE WORLD BANK: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 55-71 (1976) [hereinafter cited as WORLD BANK].
5 THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, at 76 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978]. The per capita income of the countries of the world is
listed in the Appendix to this article.
6 See, eg., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
7 See, efg., Foreign Assistance Legislationfor FY 79, Part 7- Economic and-MilitaryAssistance
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In 1978, the House Committee on International Relations called
upon AID to review its policy toward the middle-income countries:
at a time when these countries still have a great need for external assist-
ance to support their economic development efforts. The committee calls
on AID to review its development objectives toward middle income coun-
tries, particularly in Latin America, and the resources which the United
States is willing to devote to their development. The development of
these countries is in the direct interest of the United States.
8
The following year reflected further congressional concern with
development problems in the Western Hemisphere. The International
Development Cooperation Act of 1979, 9 authorizing appropriations for
international development and economic assistance programs and
amending various provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act,10 con-
tained a "sense of the Congress" resolution emphasizing the greater use
of public and private resources for development programs in Latin
America and the Caribbean. 1 This joint resolution replaced the House
directive which stated that U.S. development aid to these areas should
be "significantly increased."12
Now that we have crossed the threshold of the 1980's, it is appro-
priate to undertake a reassessment of the role foreign economic assist-
ance can and should play in U.S. policy toward the increasing number
of middle-income countries. This article endeavors to contribute to
that reassessment by examining the nature of the interests of the United
States served by the development of those countries, analyzing their
continuing development needs, and proposing a foreign aid policy
which is responsive to the new reality of this large segment of the devel-
oping world.
The discussion below focuses on Latin America and the Carib-
bean; two reasons support an emphasis on this region. First, as was
noted above, the region includes many of the countries which have
been labeled middle-income. Examining the present economic and so-
cial conditions in this region offers an excellent case study of the con-
for Latin America, Hearings Before the Subcommt. on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm
on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess., at vii, viii (1978) (recommendations of the Sub-
comm.) [hereinafter cited as Assistancefor Latin America Hearings].
8 House REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
9 International Development Cooperation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-53, 93 Stat. 359 (1979)
(to be codified in scattered sections of 7, 22 U.S.C.).
10 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, § 102, 75 Stat. 424 (1961) (current version at 22 U.S.C.
§ 2151 (1979)).
t 1 INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT OF 1979, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 96-397,
96th Cong., 1st Sess. 36 (1979) (Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Conference),




tinuing development needs of all middle-income countries. The second
reason involves the particularly strong ties linking the countries of this
hemisphere. It is useful to explore the extent of U.S. self-interest in the
development of these middle-income countries.
THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN "MIDDLE-INCOME" AND
"LOW-INCOME" LDC's
The term "middle-income countries" derives from a general recog-
nition by development assistance policymakers that LDC's differ in
terms of development achievements, problems, and prospects, as well
as their importance to the United States. 13 The term further implies
that foreign economic policy tools such as bilateral aid should be re-
fined to take into account these differences. 4
The World Bank includes fifty-eight countries in the middle-in-
come category of its World Development Report, 1978.'1 Although the
Bank uses several factors to determine inclusion in this category, it uses
only one, per capita GNP, for loan eligibility for the IDA. 6 The cut-
off point for such eligibility is $580 yearly per capita income. The
United States, on the other hand, defines middle-income countries as
being those countries that are above the $580 level but still within the
overall World Bank middle-income category. For purposes of this arti-
cle, therefore, the term "middle-income countries" will refer to the list
of thirty-seven countries included in a U.S. government working paper
that served as the basis of discussion for an interagency meeting that
focused on U.S. international economic policy toward these coun-
tries.
17
While distinguishing between "middle-income" and "low-income"
LDC's is useful conceptually, the practice of relying on per capita in-
come as the determining criterion poses several problems. First, the
figure is arbitrary. Line-drawing on the basis of per capita income is
particularly troublesome in the case of the LDC's, where economic
data often is unavailable, in error, mishandled, or deliberately dis-
13 For one of the earliest discussions of the term "middle-income" by a multilateral institu-
tion, see WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, supra note 5, at 56-65.
14 See, eg., HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
15 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, supra note 5, at 76-77.
16 WORLD BANK, supra note 4, at 60.
17 U S International Economic Policy Towards 'Middle Income" Developing Countries 10-11
(Jan. 8, 1979) (document prepared by the Development Coordinating Committee) [hereinafter
cited as US. International Economic Policy]. The thirty-seven countries on the U.S. list are those
that appear in the Appendix, between the Ivory Coast) ($610 per capita income) and Israel ($3920
per capita income) inclusive.
Northwestern Journal of
International Law & Business 2:94(1980)
torted. Thus, meaningful distinctions in terms of economic develop-
ment and need for assistance are not possible between countries
immediately above and below the $580 line; distinctions among coun-
tries within the middle-income and lower-income groups are even more
dubious. Aside from statistical difficulties, the perception of what is a
middle-income country often is influenced by the specific policy issue
being addressed or by the specific policy makers."s
A second problem with labeling countries "middle-income" on the
basis of per capita income is the tenuous relationship between per cap-
ita income and development. 9 The House Committee on International
Relations recognized this difficulty when it requested AID to review its
development objectives toward middle-income countries:
The Agency should reassess its criteria for allocating bilateral assistance.
The Committee is aware of the shortcomings of per capita income as a
measure of economic development and does not consider that a particular
figure of per capita income necessarily indicates a particular level of de-
velopment. The experience of Latin America illustrates that in countries
whose development has produced two separate economies, the modem
and the traditional, per capita GNP reflects the performance only of the
modem sector. It says very little about the tragedy of the rural poor. A
per capita income figure of $550 or more inadequately expresses the fact
that half the Hemisphere's population has an annual income of $125 or
less and one third of the people live on $70 or less each year.
Much remains to be accomplished even in the developing countries
with higher per capita incomes. Rural as well as urban unemployed and
underemployed must be integrated into the national economies. The
economies are lacking in the managerial skills necessary for stability and
continued growth, and the United States has much to offer in this area.
20
In short, the per capita income statistic fails as an index of development
and does not disclose the entire range of development problems: dual
economies, unemployment, uncontrolled population growth, pollution,
inflation, unequal distribution of income, lack of natural resources, and
others. As a measure of need for development assistance, the per capita
income statistic cannot make meaningful distinctions between coun-
tries close to one another on the per capita income scale because of the
arbitrariness of the cut-off point. Meaningful distinctions based solely
on per capita income are problematic even between countries far apart
18 For example, the Dominican Republic might be viewed as "middle-income" in terms of
agricultural production when compared with Haiti. On the other hand, the Dominican Republic
would be viewed as "low-income" in terms of industrialization when compared with Mexico or
Brazil. The per capita income figure chosen to divide middle and low income countries may be
raised or lowered to accommodate these perceptions.
19 Assistancefor Latin America Hearings, supra note 7, at vii.
20 HousE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16.
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on that scale. An oil rich country with a small population may have a
relatively high per capita income and yet face almost all the develop-
ment problems common to countries on the low end of the scale.
The danger of assuming that a country labeled middle-income no
longer requires or merits development assistance is apparent in two
contexts. The first context involves the first generation poverty-related
development problems prevalent among all LDC's: hunger, lack of
clothing and housing, inadequate health and educational facilities,
population increasing faster than resources, and deterioration of the ru-
ral environment. These problems affect different countries to varying
intensities but they do not disappear at the point a country reaches the
magic number of $580 in per capita income.
The second context involves the so-called second generation devel-
opment problems. Development introduces its own type of problems
such as pollution, natural resource shortages-especially petroleum-
and rapid urbanization by the poor, uneducated, and unskilled rural
masses. With respect to both the first and second generation develop-
ment problems, there is a continuing role for a flexible, responsive and
creative development assistance policy.
CONTINUING DEBATE ON U.S. FOREIGN ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE
POLICY TOWARD MIDDLE-INCOME COUNTRIES
Two distinct schools of thought on the role of foreign assistance
can be discerned in U.S. policy toward middle-income countries. The
more conservative and traditional view holds that U.S. foreign aid has
virtually no role in any of the middle-income countries, and that bilat-
eral aid from the United States should be discontinued near the time a
country advances to the magic number of $580 in per capita income.2'
With the achievement of this income level, the more appropriate U.S.
policy is to relate to these countries through trade concessions, private
investment, commercial capital flows, harder-term multilateral devel-
opment bank loans, and something characterized as "technology trans-
fer."
22
The other school of thought, which is advanced in this article, is
that bilateral concessional aid can perform a crucial role not only in
helping middle-income countries overcome key development con-
straints, but also in serving as a needed foreign policy tool with which
the United States can relate to a number of countries of great impor-
21 US. International Economic Policy, supra note 17, at 2, 82-85.
22 Id. at 122-31.
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tance to it. Adherents to this approach tend to regard U.S. trade, com-
modities, and technology initiatives as often politically difficult to
implement. Even if such actions were politically feasible, they would
not be adequate for dealing with some of the most critical problems of
middle-income countries. Also necessary, according to this view, is the
development of a U.S. economic assistance program that is flexible
enough to address some of the key development problems of vital con-
cern both to middle-income countries and to the United States.23
While the debate between advocates of these two points of view
rages within the U.S. Government, outside the government there is
growing concern that the United States has not yet developed a satis-
factory and comprehensive policy toward middle-income countries.24
This perception of a policy void exists in spite of numerous expressions
of concern about Latin America by top U.S. leaders, including several
high level visits to that area25 and the priority accorded by the adminis-
tration to the passage of the Panama Canal Treaties. 26 Growing con-
gressional and public sentiment for the reduction of foreign aid,
however, has resulted in cuts in planned total assistance levels and an
inability to go forward with further actions that might benefit the hemi-
sphere. As one prominent commentator on U.S.-Latin American rela-
tions recently wrote: "Many of the toughest problems affecting the
region-particularly items on the economic agenda-have yet to be se-
riously faced."'2 7
Meanwhile, as the debate over a strategy continues, bilateral
assistance levels for Latin America continue to be dramatically re-
duced, in nominal as well as real terms, compared to the levels of a few
years ago.28 AID financing in the region has fallen from $573.7 million
in 196729 to $187.4 million in 1977.30 More significantly, in 1977, Latin
23 HOUSE REPORT, supra note 2, at 16-17.
24 See, e.g., Fagen, The CarterAdministration and Latin .4merica: Business as Usual, 57 For-
eign Aff. 652 (1979).
25 See, e.g., HOUSE COMM. ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, SUBCOMM. ON INTER-AMERICAN
AFFAIRS, THE UNITED STATES IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, REPORT OF A STUDY MISSION TO
COLUMBIA, ECUADOR, PERU, CHILE, ARGENTINA, AND BRAzIL, 95TH CONG., 2D SESS. (Comm.
Print 1978).
26 Panama Canal Act of 1979, P.L. No. 96-70, 93 Stat. 452 (1979) (to be codified in scattered
sections of 22 U.S.C.).
27 Lowenthal, Latin America: .A Not-So-SpecialRelationshp, 32 Foreign Pol'y 107, 113 (1978).
28 Assistancefor Latin America Hearings supra note 7, at 8 (statement of Terence Todman).
AID assistance to Latin America, which in the 1960's accounted for most of U.S. assistance to the
region, is now less than one-third of earlier levels. Id
29 Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-June
30, 1974 (prepared for Congress by the AID Office of Program and Information Analysis Services,
Bureau for Program Policy and Coordination).
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American repayments on old U.S. loans exceeded by $70 million new
U.S. loans to the hemisphere.31 Even considering the much higher
levels of multilateral lending, it is estimated that the annual debt paid
by nations of the Western Hemisphere on earlier loans now equals 93
cents of every dollar disbursed by the U.S. AID programs and the in-
ternational financial institutions.32 If current trends are not reversed,
the U.S. bilateral aid program will be draining resources from Latin
America and the Caribbean throughout the coming decade.
This situation is especially undesirable, because the Latin Ameri-
can and Caribbean region is entering the 1980's at a critical stage in its
development.33 The economic growth strategies previously pursued by
many countries are undergoing substantial rethinking. 34 A number of
governments are moving toward more democratic systems and greater
respect for human rights.35  These governments are groping for new
models of development that can deal more effectively with fundamen-
30 Agency for International Development, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, July 1, 1945-Sep-
tember 30, 1977, at 35 (prepared for Congress by the AID Office of Program and Information
Analysis Services, Bureau for Program Policy and Coordination).
31 See Agency for International Development, Loan Repayments-A.I.D.'s Contribution to
the "Capital Drain" in Latin America (1978) (internal briefing paper written for March 1978 Con-
gressional Hearings on FY 1979 Foreign Assistance Act).
32 Lowenthal, supra note 27, at 118.
33 See Latin America" Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Western Hemisphere Affairs of the
Senate Comm, on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1978) (statement of James D.
Theberge) [hereinafter cited as Latin American Hearings]. Theberge asserted:
In the past several years, a new realism and greater self-confidence has emerged in Latin
American leadership circles. The vision of united Latin American political-economic bloc
capable of wringing economic concessions from a reluctant United States has faded along
with the high hopes of creating a series of primary commodity cartels, following the success-
ful example of OPEC. Latin American political leaders have begun to think realistically
about the inter-American systems and the United States, and what can reasonably be ex-
pected from both. Concrete steps to strengthen bilateral relations have been especially wel-
comed, and there has been a sharp decline in confrontational rhetoric and posturing. The
new spirit of pragmatism blowing through Latin America has affected even Cuba.
34 Id at 66 (statement of Albert Fishlow). Fishlow stated:
Rapid growth experienced over the last decade in Latin America has not translated into gains
uniformly distributed across the income spectrum. Although the fragmentary data do not
confirm that the poor have been getting absolutely worse off, the information does point to a
relative deterioration in many countries .... Most basically, the emphasis upon rapid
growth in a capitalist market setting in which labor is both abundant and politically power-
less leads to a bias against the poor. Instead of governmental policy becoming the principal
means of compensating for harsh market forces, it has reinforced them. . . . The very cir-
cumstances of rapid economic growth and subsequent adjustment to slower expansion has
increased sensitivity to the large inequalities of income in Latin America.
35 By the mid-1970's the authoritarian regimes in Latin America, some established in over-
throws of democratically elected governments in the 1960's, had begun to lose some of their influ-
ence. Id at 86 (statement of Richard F. Weber). See generally Human Rights and United States
Foreign Policy A Review of the Administration's Record, Hearings Before the Subcomna on Inter-
national Organizations of the House Comm on InternationalRelations, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
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tal problems of poverty, unemployment and income distribution.36
Because the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean are
moving toward new policies and programs, the 1980's can mark a sig-
nificant turning point towards greater equity and greater respect for
human rights, including the rights to be free from hunger, disease, and
poverty, as well as from political repression. The movement for
change, however, is very fragile.37 Technical and economic resources
are not always available. 8 Without adequate support during the criti-
cal transition period of the 1980's, countries easily could slip back into
older style political and economic forms. 9
A COMMON DESTINY: U.S. INTERESTS IN LATIN AMERICAN
DEVELOPMENT
Before examining the continuing development needs of the mid-
dle-income countries and proposing a new foreign aid policy that is
responsive to those needs, it is essential to recognize just why the
United States should be concerned with the fate of the middle-income
countries, particularly in Latin America. Quite simply, the United
States has vital interests at stake in the middle-income countries, and
the protection of these interests depends on the continued development
of middle-income countries in a direction positively oriented to the
United States.n° These interests, which will be discussed below, can be
categorized as economic, strategic, political, and social and cultural.
Despite such categorization for analytical purposes, they are all part of
the overall U.S. national security interest of surviving and prospering
in an increasingly interdependent world.4'
This discussion will focus on Latin America, because no matter
how firmly it is stated that the days of a "special relationship" between
the United States and Latin America are over, there are important rea-
sons why the U.S. must continue to be concerned with the nations of
the hemisphere. In addition to the fact that half of its people are living
36 See generally Latin American Hearings, supra note 33, at 60 (statement of Albert Fishlow).
37 See generally INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, PROPOSAL FOR AN INCREASE IN THE
RESOURCES OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK 1-9 (1978).
38 The adequacy of future capital flows will be an important determinant of the growth capac-
ity of many of the countries of Latin America. Debt service cost is already high for many coun-
tries, particularly Mexico and Brazil. The overall regional debt is expected to double by 1985,
although it will be more evenly distributed than necessary to accept a much higher ratio of service
payments to exports than was thought appropriate a few years ago. See, e.g., Latin American
Hearings, supra note 33, at 64 (statement of Albert Fishlow).
39 Id at 68.
40 Id at 23 (statement of Thomas E. Skidmore).
41 Id at 132 (statement of Abraham Katz).
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in dire poverty, if Latin American development progresses successfully
and if the United States maintains its close and cooperative relation-
ship with the region, Latin America will afford exciting opportunities
for mutually beneficial activities. If, on the other hand, development in
the region falters and the United States fails to maintain cooperative
ties, serious problems surely will result.
Economic Interests
Probably the most important U.S. interests in the middle-income
countries are economic. These interests can be divided into two basic
categories: (1) "positive economic interests," which refers to the bene-
fits for the U.S. economy that will attend continued development of
middle-income countries; and (2) "negative economic interests," which
involves the costs to the U.S. economy that can be anticipated if pov-
erty is not reduced substantially in middle-income countries.
Positive economic interests. While "interdependence" has become
almost a cliche, its truth is nowhere better illustrated than in the eco-
nomic links binding the nations of the Western Hemisphere. The pres-
ent level of U.S. investment in Latin America is approximately $27.7
billion, which comprises 82% of total U.S. investments in the develop-
ing world.4 2 These investments earn annual returns of $3.9 billion,43
the significance of which is especially great in light of present U.S. bal-
ance of payments difficulties and the weakness of the dollar. A stable,
growing Latin America will provide ever widening opportunities for
U.S. private investment.
Latin America is also a very important trade partner for the
United States. Indeed, Latin America is the third largest export market
for the United States, purchasing $17-18 billion of U.S. goods and serv-
ices annually." This figure is greater than the amount the United
States sells to the rest of the developing world combined, and it is al-
most as much as the U.S. exports to the European Economic Commu-
nity.
45
42 U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 58 SURVEY OF CURRENT
BUSINESS No. 8, U.S. DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD IN 1977 16 (1978) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
DIRECT INVESTMENT ABROAD].
43 Id. at 22.
44 From 1975 to 1977, the U.S. shipped between $16.8 billion to $17.9 billion of exports to
Latin America. U.S. BUREAU OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 58 SURVEY OF
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While figures on current U.S. exports to the region are impressive,
they pale beside the tremendous potential of the future. A developed
and prosperous Latin America-positively oriented to the United
States-could be an almost limitless market for American goods and
services. Lower transport costs, for example, could give the United
States an advantage over other potential suppliers.
Latin America and the Caribbean represent a tremendous market,
with a population of 320 million people and a combined gross national
product of over $400 billion, an amount exceeded only by those of the
United States, the Soviet Union, Japan, and West Germany.46 Already
U.S. exports have tripled over the last decade, and the $17-18 billion
total is two-and-one-half times higher than just five years ago.4 7 This
record and the promises of a continually growing market are especially
significant at a time when U.S. Trade with Europe and Japan is beset
by problems and when the United States is experiencing very large
trade deficits.
In addition to serving as a substantial export market, Latin
America supplies the United States with some of its most critical im-
ports. Nearly 20% of U.S. petroleum imports come from the region, as
do even larger proportions of copper, bauxite, tin, manganese, lead,
zinc, and other commodities.48 Latin America promises to become
even more important to the United States as a supplier of crucial raw
materials, since it is estimated to have the world's largest potential for
energy development 4 9 both in hydrocarbons50 and non-traditional en-
ergy sources. 51
On the monetary side, and related to the fact that the United
States is Latin America's largest export market, almost all Latin Ameri-
can currencies are pegged to the dollar on international markets. Thus
all the countries in this hemisphere have a common stake in the dollar's
health.
52
46 Latin American Hearings, supra note 33, at 49 (statement of Henry P. Geyelin).
47 Id
48 Id.
49 Id at 50.
50 CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, MEXICO'S OIL AND GAS POLICY: AN ANALYSIS,
SEN. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (Comm. Print). Mexico alone has
been estimated to have possible reserves of over 200 billion barrels of oil. Id
51 Brazil has the largest, totally renewable, nonpolluting source of energy in the world today.
The Amazon River, out of which flows over 20% of all the fresh water in the world, has thirteen
tributaries which are larger than the Mississippi. See Latin American Hearings supra note 33, at
50 (statement of Henry P. Geyelin).
52 See WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 1976 50-54 (1976). The vulnerability of Latin
America to economic downturns in the industrial world was evidenced by the sharp decline in the
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Negative economic effets. While continued Latin American devel-
opment promises tremendous benefits for the U.S. economy, the poten-
tial for failure portends disastrous consequences. Of these, only two
will be discussed: environmental destruction and waste of scarce natu-
ral resources, and uncontrolled entry of illegal immigrants.
The process of environmental destruction and waste of scarce nat-
ural resources has already assumed alarming dimensions in at least one
Latin American country: Brazil. Currently the forests of Brazil's Ama-
zon region supply 85% of the world timber market.5 3 Now, however,
the world's largest tropical rain forest is being devastated to make way
for ranches, farms, mines, roads, and settlements. As one former U.N.
ecologist stated: "The destruction gets cheaper and more efficient every
year. If deforestation continues at its present rate, the Brazilians could
very well end up creating another Sahara."54 The plight of the Ama-
zon is a perfect example of the kind of negative spillover effect that the
United States will experience if it fails to take an active role in the
development of middle-income countries. Brazil is hardly a poor coun-
try; yet its level of technological and ecological awareness begs for con-
tinued U.S. development assistance.
As counterpoint to environmental destruction-a "second-genera-
tion" development problem arising from too rapid economic growth-
the problem of undocumented workers, or illegal immigrants, arises
from existing and increasingly widespread poverty in Latin America.
The undocumented worker is a flesh-and-blood emblem of the interde-
pendence of this hemisphere.56 The Immigration and Naturalization
Service estimates that 60% of undocumented workers are Mexican, en-
tering at an annual rate of 300,000 to 600,000.57 The second largest
source group is the Caribbean countries, including Haiti, the Domini-
can Republic, and Jamaica, with an estimated 100,000 undocumented
increases of Latin American exports and output during fiscal year 1976. The decline is attributed
to the recession in the industrial countries of Europe and North America. Id at 50-51.
53 Rohter, 7heAmazon Basin's ForestrAre Going Up In Smoke, Wash. Post, Jan. 5, 1979, § A,
at 14, col. 1.
54 Id
55 See generally Undocumented Workers: Implicationsfor U.S. Foreign Policy in the Western
Hemisphere, Hearings Before the Subcomtm on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm. on In-
ternational Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Undocumented Workers
Hearings].
56 Fifteen countries comprise the major undocumented worker source countries: Mexico, Ha-
iti, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Guatemala, Colombia, Peru, Ecuador, the Philippines, Ko-
rea, Thailand, Greece, India, Iran, and Nigeria. Western Hemisphere countries account for an
estimated 90% of all illegal migration into the United States. Undocumented Workers Hearing,
supra note 62, at 2 (statement of Leonel J. Castillo).
57 Id at 12 (statement of Arnold Nochmanofl).
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entries per year.
5 8
The eight countries which are the leading sources of undocu-
mented workers are among the closest Western Hemisphere neighbors
of the United States.5 9 Thus, to a large extent, the problem is an inter-
American problem, the root causes of which lie in the lack of economic
opportunity in the source countries, and the symptoms of which are
manifested largely in those countries throughout the hemisphere which
offer these opportunities.6" This migration of labor into the United
States is leading to increasing defacto economic integration of North,
Central, and South America and the Caribbean. Unless and until eco-
nomic opportunities and living conditions for the poor improve in
Latin America, the flow is going to continue in the direction of the
much more affluent North America.
The poverty which motivates the continued outflow of workers
from Latin America to the United States is not only historical. It is also
the product of growth strategies and development policies pursued by
many Latin American and Caribbean countries.61 The Caribbean
countries serve as an example, for their poverty and employment
problems have been further accentuated by the narrow natural resource
base of the islands and limitations imposed on economic growth by
small internal markets.62
Over much of the last two decades most of the Caribbean coun-
tries followed a development strategy that emphasized import substitu-
tion industrialization or tourism, both of which relied heavily upon
external private finance.63 The growth of industrialization has been ac-
58 Id
59 In addition to Mexico, Haiti, the Dominican Republic, and Jamaica, the other important
neighboring sources are the countries of Guatemala, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. Note that
these are the same countries that exhibit the greatest demand for legal entry into the United States,
as determined by the number of entry applications. Id at 2 (statement of Leonel J. Castillo).
60 This has been characterized as the "push-pull" phenomena, where unfavorable economic
opportunities, including low per capita income and high unemployment "push" people to leave
their home areas. The per capita incomes of the eight leading source countries are: Mexico $1100,
Jamaica $1150, the Dominican Republic $720, Haiti $190, Guatemala $570, Peru $760, Colombia
$580, and Ecuador $590. In some areas unemployment rages as high as 40%. The "pull" is the
attraction of earning wages six to ten times higher than is available in the United States. Addi-
tional attractions exist in the prospect of living in an urban area with its infrastructure, such as
electricity, running water and public transport, and the available social amenities and services. Id
at 12, 13 (statement of Arnold Nochmanoft).
61 The inadequacy of Latin American and Caribbean population control policies is a clear
contributor to the emigration problem. See generally, Undocumented Workers Hearings, supra
note 55, at 2-26 (statement of Arnold Nochmanofi).
62 See generally de Azua, Small Nations and the "Constrictive" Style of Development, CEPAL
REv., 2d Sem. 1977, at 153.
63 Chernick, The Commonwealth Caribbean, WORLD BANK 20-24 (1975).
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companied by a dependence on capital-intensive imported technology
and imported inputs for manufacturers. 64 In recent years, a decline in
foreign exchange earnings from tourism, traditional exports, and direct
foreign investment has led to shortages of imported inputs and subse-
quently to layoffs and declining production in domestic industries.
65
Agricultural development has been largely ignored in many Carib-
bean countries.66 Agricultural employment has declined despite popu-
lation growth and limited employment alternatives, and food imports
have risen sharply.6 7
Stagnating agricultural sectors and modern urban-industrial sec-
tors have been unable to provide sufficient employment opportunities
to the Caribbean's rapidly expanding population. Skilled and profes-
sional workers are unable to find adequate employment opportunities
even though the region suffers from a serious shortage of trained tech-
nical and managerial personnel. 68 As a result, massive unemploy-
ment-ranging from 15 to 45%--and extensive emmigration of skilled
and professional workers have become a way of life in the heavily
populated Caribbean islands.69
Many of the Caribbean countries are now experiencing stagnating
or declining employment, production, and exports, which have resulted
in severe balance of payments and fiscal problems, such as in Jamaica,
where a stringent IMF agreement is now in effect.70 These problems
have made it virtually impossible for the Caribbean countries to ad-
dress their problems of poverty and lack of economic opportunity with-
out considerable outside help.
64 Public policies frequently have favored capital intensive investments in both urban and
rural sectors, rather than maximizing the use of available labor. See Undocumented Workers
Hearings, supra note 55, at 30 (statement by Sally A. Shelton).
65 Fagen, supra note 24, at 699.
66 See generally Food is a Challengefor Mexican Regime, N.Y. Times, Jan. 9, 1979, § a, at 6,
col. 1; New Stress on Agriculture inAiding Latin America, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1979, § iv, at 1, col.
1.
67 See generally Iglesias, The Ambivalence of Latin American Agriculture, CEPAL Rav., 2d
Half, 1978, at 11.
68 See, e.g., Rosenthal, Economic Trends in CentralAmerica, CEPAL REv., 2d Sem., 1978, at
45. Rosenthal noted:
Twenty-seven years of impressive economic growth have brought scarcely any improvement
in the material welfare of a significant proportion of Central America's population, and the
economies have not grown at a rapid enough rate to even begin to offer full employment. On
the average, unemployment is anything between 8-15% of the economically active popula-
tion, while it is estimated that underemployment probably ranges between 40-50%.
Id at 47.
69 Iglesias, supra note 67, at 12.
70 For Socialist Jamaica, Big Capital.Infusion May Be The Only Salvation, Wall St. J., Feb. 25,
1980, at 1, col. 1.
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Other Interests
Apart from economic interests, the other interests the United
States must protect in Latin America are strategic, political, and socio-
cultural. Of these non-economic interests, U.S. strategic concerns are
of the most obvious importance. Those interests clearly would be
threatened by a hostile military power in this hemisphere.7' They are
equally threatened by the potential for political turmoil that attends the
region's increasing poverty, unemployment, and unequal distribution
of wealth.
The political importance of the region of the United States stems
from the increasing importance of the Latin American countries as
leaders of the developing world.72 Many of the most significant initia-
tives that have been undertaken by the "South" have been proposed by
Latin American leaders. For example, the Latins were among the first
to organize their own regional development banks.73 The Latins have
been a significant force behind changes in international laws of the ar-
eas,74 and Latins have been some of the foremost intellectual leaders in
defining the agenda for the "New International Economic Order. '75 It
71 See generally Arms Trade in the Western Hemisphere, Hearings before the Subcomm. on In-
ter-American Affairs ofthe House Comm. on International Relations, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
72 Latin American Hearings, supra note 33, at 8 (statement of James D. Theberge). Theberge
stated:
In the past decade or so, new centers of economic power and rivalry (Japan, Western Europe,
the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Eruope, Mainland China, and the Arab oil states) have emerged
onto the world scene along with a new group of middle level regional powers: in Asia, Korea,
Taiwan and Indonesia; in Africa, Egypt, South Africa, and Nigeria; in Latin America, Argen-
tina, Brazil, Venezuela and Mexico.
These new global and regional powers have become poles of political-economic attrac-
tion for the smaller, weaker states in their immediate vicinity. While small states are inexora-
bly drawn into the political-economic orbits of their more powerful neighbors, the
multiplicity of power centers that characterizes the present world system has also provided
them with new options for their political, commercial and military relations. They can seek
to balance the weight of regional or subregional powers by seeking extra-regional ties. They
now have a range of options, and a degree of political independence, in the formulation of
their foreign and development policies that did not exist two decades ago. And they are
exercising these options to an increasing extent in the 1970's.
73 The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) was formed on December 30, 1959 by 20
American nations-19 Latin American countries and the United States-in order to accelerate the
development of its member countries, individually and collectively. The Bank works to promote
private and public capital investment for development purposes, as well as making loans and
guarantees available for development projects that might not be able to secure private capital at
reasonable terms. The Bank has its own capital resources, and is also chartered to raise funds in
the world financial markets. See generally INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, THIS IS THE
INTER-AMERiCAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (1967).
74 Examples include the Law of the Sea negotiations and the provisions of article 24 of the
Andean Pact.
75 Declaration on the Establishment of a New Int'l Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 & 3202,
U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 1), U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprinted in 2 A NEw INT'L ECONOMIC
ORDER: SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1945-1975, at 891-93 (G. Moss and N. Winston eds. 1975).
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also seems clear that the middle-income countries of Latin America can
be models for other developing regions.76 If the Latins consider their
development goals to be hindered by the policies of the United States,
or if the U.S. is indifferent to their problems, the United States will
forego an important opportunity for shaping a creative new relation-
ship with the developing countries that is more responsive to the
problems of an interdependent world. A related political danger is the
loss of Latin American support for U.S. initiatives in the United Na-
tions, the OAS, and other international organizations.
Finally, the United States has strong cultural, ethnic, and histori-
cal ties with the Latin American nations. The most visible manifesta-
tions of these ties are the more than 16 million U.S. citizens of Hispanic
origin, making the United States the fourth largest Spanish-speaking
nation in this hemisphere." In the future, Hispanics will play an in-
creasingly important role in formulating U.S. foreign policy toward
Latin America and the rest of the world.
The United States, therefore, has strong reasons for concern about
Latin America's current situation and a very strong need for bilateral
tools with which to respond to the region's most serious development
problems.
THE CONTINUING DEVELOPMENT NEEDS OF LATIN AMERICA
The precise development needs of Latin America is a critical issue
that need now to be determined. Assuming the stake that the United
States has in the future development of Latin America, some argue that
the region already is well on the way to solving its development
problems and that the people of the region are now prepared to solve
those problems on their own. In support of this argument the analysts
might cite Latin America's per capita income, which is higher than per
capita income figures from "low-income" countries,78 as well as the an-
nual growth rate of Latin American countries, which in recent years
has averaged a respectable five percent.79
While these overall economic indicators are somewhat encourag-
ing, the truth is that Latin America still is best characterized by "pock-
ets of development;" a thin, superficial veneer of modernity across
76 See Latin American Hearings, supra note 33, at 48 (statement of Richard R. Fagen).
77 The three countries with larger Spanish speaking populations are Brazil, Mexico, and Ar-
gentina. WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, supra note 5, at 77.
78 Id. at 76-77.
79 See INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL PROGRESS IN LATIN
AMERICA 7 (1977) [hereinafter cited as PROGRESS].
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large areas of poverty.80 Aside from the poverty which overwhelmingly
characterizes the economies of these middle-income countries, "second
generation" development problems have attended the economic growth
of recent decades.
A partial picture of continuing Latin American poverty problems
can be gleaned from the following regional socio-economic indicators:
A substantial economic gap still exists between the developed countries
like the United States and the countries referred to as middle-income,
but which in fact have per capita incomes much nearer the lower-in-
come countries, in the range of $580 to $1500.81 In the United States,
per capita income is approximately six times the Latin American aver-
age.8z In 1977, half of the region's 320 million people lived on average
incomes of less than $200 a year.83 One of every five Latin Americans
earned only $85 a year.84 In 1970, unemployment and underemploy-
ment varied among countries between 13% and 32%.85 Those figures
are increasing, and during the 1974 recession there is every reason to
believe the rates were even higher.86 In Mexico, for example, unem-
ployment currently stands at 25%, and the Mexican economy must pro-
duce 600,000 to 700,000 jobs per year just to remain at this level.87
Other measures, such as caloric intake, infant mortality, life expec-
tancy, and literacy tell the same story: about half of Latin America's
people have enjoyed very little, if any, of the benefits of two decades of
national economic growth.88
The poverty of Latin America is disturbing not only in its extent,
but also because of the insufficient speed with which it is being reduced.
Although the proportionate number of people living in poverty de-
clined during the 1960's and early 1970's by 10%, to 40% of the total
population, the absolute number remained constant.89 Furthermore, in
80 See also International Development Assistance Authorization and S. Res. 118 Hearings
Before the Subcomm on Foreign Assistance of the Sen. Comm on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong.,
2d Sess. 190-229 (1978) (statement of See'y of State, Cyrus Vance).
81 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, supra note 5, at 76-77.
82 Id
83 Economic and Military Assistancefor Latin America: Foreign Assistance Legislationfor FY
80-81 (Part 5), Hearings Beore the Subcomm. on Inter-American Affairs of the House Comm on
Foreign Affairs, 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 26 (1979) (statement of Viron Vaky) [hereinafter cited as
Economic and Military Assistance Hearings].
84 Pinto, Styles of Development in Latin America, CEPAL REv., 1st Sem., 1976, at 99, 118.
85 PRorRESS, supra note 79, at 129.
86 Id
87 Mexico Wants FullReview of Ties in Carter Talks, N.Y. Times, Feb. 8, 1979, § A, at 12, col.
1.
88 Rosenthal, supra note 68, at 47.
89 CEPAL, THE LATIN AMERICAN ECONOMY IN 1978, at 3 (1979).
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view of the reduced rate of economic growth in the most recent years, it
is likely that there has been an increase in the number of poor house-
holds.f0
The hopes of the desperately poor continue to be frustrated by
problems common throughout the region, the most serious of which are
high population growth91 and lack of agricultural development.92
Land reform is needed. Average family farm size is inadequate and
there are many, totally landless peasants. An important consequence
of the failure to deal with rural poverty is accelerated migration from
rural areas to cities,93 with resultant spreading of urban slums. Mexico
City, for example, grew from 4.4 million to 12.2 million people between
1950 and 1978; Bogota grew from 600,000 to 3.8 million during the
same period.94 Throughout Latin America, slums have grown in and
around almost every city and town; health, water, educational, and san-
itation facilities have been inadequate; the physical environment has
deteriorated; crime and social unrest have increased as traditional so-
cial and cultural values have been eroded; and the number of shoeshine
boys, street vendors, and other underemployed workers has multi-
plied.
95
The high rate of population growth has compounded the problem
of urban poverty as well as contributed to rural poverty and the flood
of the rural poor to the cities. Mexico's population, for example, has
been growing at a startling 3.4% per year since 1960.96 World Bank
projections show Mexico having a population of nearly 130 million in
the year 2000, 9 7 of which the Mexico City urbanized area would ac-
count for over 30 million inhabitants.98
One of the reasons, of course, for the continued existence of exten-
sive poverty in Latin America and the Caribbean is that the poor have
not shared in the increase of national income. During the ten years
between the early 1960's and the early 1970's, the forty percent of the
population which did not succeed in breaking out of poverty saw their
90 Id
91 PROGRESS, supra note 79, at 390.
92 See generally WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, supra note 5, at 61-63.
93 PROGRESS, supra note 79, at 390.
94 Cohen, Cities in Developing Countries, FIN. & DEV. 12-15 (1976).
95 INTERNATIONALE LABOUR OFFICE, REGIONAL EMPLOYMENT PROGRAMME FOR LATIN
AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN (PREALC), THE EMPLOYMENT PROBLEM IN LATIN AMERICA:
FACT, OUTLOOKS AND POLICIES 6, 33-38 (1976).
96 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, supra note 5, at 100-01.
97 Id. at 106-07.
98 1 INTERNATIONAL BANK OF RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT, SPATIAL DEVELOP-
MENT IN MEXICO 37 (1979).
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share in the total income fall from about ten percent to nine percent.99
In other words, about nine-tenths of the growth in national income
benefitted those who had not been poor even a decade before; more-
over, six-tenths of the growth in income went to the richest twenty per-
cent of the population. i°
Thus poverty has continued and, indeed, increased at the same
time that Latin American economies have experienced overall
favorable growth. This is the truth behind the deceptively positive
trends in such macro-economic indicators as per capita income.
Latin America's skewed economic development may be very much
the result of development strategies formulated in the 1950's and early
1960's and pressed upon the LDC's by developed Western countries.
These strategies were designed to achieve two basic objectives: eco-
nomic growth and economic independence. Generally such strategies
called for concentration on capital intensive growth policies which
would stimulate modern manufacturing industries. 10' Such industries,
it was argued, would not only contribute growth and independence but
would create sufficient additional employment to absorb the surplus
unemployed and underemployed agricultural workers. In this way,
benefits would "trickle down" to the poor.0 2 If benefits failed to be
widely distributed, they could be redistributed through government
programs.
While these policies and programs were encouraging capital-inten-
sive, labor-saving industrialization, relatively little was being done to
stimulate rural development, in general, or agriculture 10 3 and small, la-
bor-intensive rural and urban industry, in particular.0 4 Insufficient at-
tention was focused on the development and use of new labor-
intensive, light-capital technologies that could increase productivity
and expand employment opportunities.
99 Pinto, supra note 84, at 118.
100 Id
101 Iglesias, supra note 67, at 12.
102 See generally Rosenthal, note 68 supra.
103 Iglesias, supra note 67, at 16. The author suggests:
The old idea of the antithesis between industrial development and agricultural development
has been left a long way behind. Today no one doubts that we must maintain rapid industrial
development, but at the same time no one doubts that, without a vigorous response on the
part of Latin American agriculture, this industrial development will sooner or later be held
back. In other words, it is not possible to conceive a dynamic and vigorous Latin America in
the year 2000 if there is an imbalance between these two aspects. There is a growing convic-
tion that in the Latin America of the coming decades the agricultural sector will be a basic
pillar of development and that unless this issue is tackled decisively, industrial development
itself will run up against consideration obstacles.
Id
104 See also WORLD BANK ANNUAL REPORT 1974, at 44, 45 (1974).
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Infrastructure for the poor, such as small irrigation systems, rural
electrification, farm-to-market roads, low-cost housing, and water and
sewage systems, have been inadequate or nonexistent.105 Health and
education services have been gradually expanded in rural areas, but the
public expenditures per rural inhabitant has been only a fraction of the
expenditures per urban resident. 106 The education that has been pro-
vided frequently is urban-biased and has less relevance in rural areas.
Health services have fostered lower morbidity rates in rural areas, but
insufficient effort was made to provide family planning services.
The results of these policies have been rapidly expanding popula-
tions, slowly expanding job opportunities and a widening gap between
the rich and the poor.0 7 There is now increasing awareness that in
order to significantly reduce absolute poverty in the foreseeable future,
specific efforts will be required to improve the lives and capabilities of
low income groups and to build increasing equity into future patterns
of economic growth.1
0 8
While poverty continues to be the major problem in most of Latin
America and the Caribbean, "second-generation" development
problems now have emerged as these countries experience rapid rates
of economic growth. Similar to the problem of poverty, many of these
problems are not being adequately addressed by Latin American gov-
erments due to a lack of funds, technical expertise, or institutional
mechanisms, and the absence of high level attention to implementing
appropriate policies.
For example, the Latin American countries are confronting envi-
ronmental problems even more serious than those in the United
States.'0 9 Many of these countries lack the financial, technical, and in-
stitutional capacity for dealing with widespread pollution and natural
resource exhaustion. Serious problems of deforestation and soil ero-
sion exist throughout the Andean countries and in advanced Central
105 Id
106 See generally Solari, Development and Economic Policy in Latin America, CEPAL REv., 2d
Sem. 1977, at 59.
107 See, ag., Pinto, supra note 84, at 118.
108 See generally Iglesias, Situation and Prospects of the Latin American Economy in 1975,
CEPAL REv., Ist Sem. 1976, at 98; Rethinking US. Foreign Policy Toward the Developing World-
A Critical Review of AID, Hearing Be/ore the Comm on International Relations and its Subcomm.
on InternationalDevelopment, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-52 (1977) (statement of John Gilligan). Gil-
ligan asserted: "Any new development approach should place a strong emphasis on the concept of
equity--the equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth throughout the society. This
equity has often been missing in post World War II preoccupation with growth." Id at 5.
109 See, e.g., Eight Nations Discuss Treaty onAmazon, N.Y. Times, Nov. 29, 1977, § A, at 2, col.
3.
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American nations, like Costa Rica and Panama. For the poorest coun-
try in the hemisphere, Haiti, resource depletion problems have reached
disastrous proportions.110
In recent years, air pollution has become a major problem in Mex-
ico City, Caracas, Rio de Janeiro, Bogota, and other large Latin Ameri-
can cities."' The sulphurous waste of smelters and refineries in high
altitudes near large mines has created a serious health hazard for
thousands of workers who live in mining towns throughout the Andes.
Rapid economic growth has outpaced governments' capacity to
build sanitation systems and untreated waste is polluting many Latin
American rivers, lakes, and oceans. A number of river systems in Peru
and Chile are so polluted by effluent from large copper smelters that
experts fear the rich soils in regions irrigated from these systems may
be seriously damaged. 1 2 With accelerating economic growth, these en-
vironmental problems will increase and could lead to irreversible dam-
age of Latin America's limited productive natural resources,
undercutting the region's future development potential.
In yet another important area-that of science and technology de-
velopment-there are similar problems. Science and technology are
fundamental instruments of modem societies, and they are among the
requisite tools necessary for the creation of self-sustaining develop-
ment. 1 3 Economic growth in Latin America, however, has not been
accompanied by an internal capacity to generate scientific and techno-
logical knowledge that can sustain high rates of economic growth, deal
with the region's serious poverty problems, and develop the new tech-
nologies that respond to local factor endowments and local needs. The
inability of Mexico, the nations of the Caribbean, and other Latin
countries to adapt foreign technologies to their labor surplus economies
is one of the reasons that economic growth has not led to expanded
employment opportunities for the rural and urban poor.
110 C. Zuvekas, Agriculteral Development in Haiti: An Assessment of Sector Problems, Poli-
cies, and Prospects Under Conditions of Severe Soil Erosion 188-97 (1978) (report prepared for
AID).
111 See generally PAN AMERICAN HEALTH ORGANIZATION, RED PAN AMERICANA DE MUES-
TRARIO DE LA CONTAMINACION DEL AIRE, REDPANAIRE INFORME 1967-74 (DrVlSiON DE SALUD
AMBIENTAL SERIE TECNICA No. 18).
112 U. S. AGENCY FOR INT'L DEV., ENVIRONMENT AND NATIONAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 96-112 (1979).
113 Foreign Assistance and Related Agencies Appropriationsfor 1979, Hearings Before the Sub-
comr on Foreign Operations and RelatedAgencies ofthe House Comr on Appropriations, Part 5,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1978) (Congressional Research Service, An Assessment ofthe Effectiveness
of the World Bank and the Inter-American Development Bank in Aiding the Poor) [hereinafter cited
as Effectiveness of the World Bank].
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The sprawling urban areas of Latin America present the region
with another second-generation development problem for the coming
decades. As was discussed in the context of Latin American poverty,
the highest rates of population and urban growth in the developing
world have led to the creation of enormous urban slums. The planning
and management of Latin America's largest cities, including the devel-
opment of alternative settlement patterns, is one of the greatest devel-
opment challenges for the remaining decades of the twentieth century.
Finally, rapid increases in petroleum prices have confronted the
region with two additional second-generation problems: the need to
develop alternative energy sources and improve conservation measures
is now widely recognized throughout the region. National energy poli-
cies and programs for developing alternative energy sources, however,
are almost non-existent.
WHY U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE IS NEEDED
Despite the numerous poverty and second-generation problems
which continue to affect Latin America, it can argued that the middle-
income countries of the region no longer need bilateral economic assist-
ance. This school of thought holds that the middle-income countries
can deal with their own development problems if only they have the
political will to do so.
To examine this view, it is necessary to examine the situation from
the perspective of a Latin American government policy-maker. What
does the landscape look like to a reform-minded leader eager to re-
spond to the poverty and second-generation development problems
that exist in most Latin American countries? First, he sees an economy
where the developed and prosperous urban industrial sector could not,
in most cases, generate savings of sufficient magnitude to adequately
attack the nation's poverty problem, let alone second-generation
problems. In addition, the nation may not have access to sufficient
credit from commercial sources to meet its financing needs for such
projects and may not be able to sustain the additional debt-servicing
burden that would result from such investments.
The leader probably also sees a delicate balance of political forces,
including powerful groups and structures that profit from trickle-down
style development policies. He knows that these groups will attempt to
protect their own interests. Most of these Latin American societies,
however, are not in any sense monolithic, and, in many, significant
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forces for change and reform are emerging.11 4 These reform-minded
groups exist in the increasingly sophisticated private business sector, in
opposition political orginizations and within the government itself.
Within national cabinets there may be at least a minority of ministers
who want to see significant changes favoring the rural and urban poor,
and although their voices may not always prevail, they increasingly are
heard and their message understood.
A growing number of ministers of education, health, agriculture,
and labor, encouraged by their constituencies, are concerned with end-
ing the neglect of the poor in their respective fields. The political scene,
however, is likely to be complex, with significant forces opposing, and
others favoring, new development programs. Foreign economic assist-
ance, such as that provided by the U.S. aid programs, often can tip the
balance in favor of those programs endorsed by the progressive ele-
ments of Latin and Caribbean countries.
Another serious problem often confronts the Latin American pol-
icy-maker: there is little certainty as to the most effective means for
solving many of Latin America's most crucial development problems.
Experience over the last two decades has demonstrated the weaknesses
of "trickle down" growth approaches, but experts are not as certain
about what alternatives should take their place. Few countries have
succeeded in developing policies that provide "growth with equity."
Recent Latin American history is replete with examples of countries,
such as Peru, Jamaica, and Guyana, that have made serious attempts to
address poverty and income distribution problems and, partly as a re-
sult of this, have experienced serious economic difficulties.
The above discussion demonstrates that Latin America still has
many development needs and that Latin America requires cooperation
from the United States to meet these needs. Moreover, the discussion
demonstrates the vital interests of the United States at stake in Latin
America and, thereby, the need for U.S. cooperation. There remains
the question, however, of why foreign economic assistance is required
for the United States to contribute effectively to economic development
in the Western Hemisphere. To be sure, other types of U.S. coopera-
tion also are necessary; increased trade and private investment, new
commodity agreements, expanded commercial bank flows, and multi-
lateral development bank lending will be required. These instruments,
114 See generally G. LODGE, ENGINES OF CHANGE: UNITED STATES INTERESTS AND REVOLU-
TION IN LATIN AMERICA (1970); L. EIMANDI, BEYOND CUBA: LATIN AMERICA TAKES CHARGE
OF ITS FUTURE (1974).
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however, do not eliminate the need for U.S. economic assistance, nor
can they substitute for bilateral aid.
There are several reasons for this nonsubstitutability. First of all,
substantial increases in cooperation do not appear to be immediately
practical in many of these areas. In the area of trade, there has been a
marked increase in protectionism in the industrialized countries, in-
cluding the United States, and pressures for further increases are
strong. 1 5 The World Bank has analyzed the situation as follows:
These pressures partly stem from the continued slow growth of the indus-
trialized countries and their consequent high levels of unemployment,
and are partly the result of the concentration of developing countries' ex-
port growth in relatively few categories of manufactured products. The
protectionist measures have entailed the use of a wide variety of devices,
for example "orderly marketing arrangements" and new import quotas;
price floors on imports, as in the case of steeland agricultural products;
new "voluntary" export restraints; "countervailing duties;" administrative
obstacles to imports; and subsidies to domestic industries to sustain levels
of production in excess of those justified by demand. There have been
calls for the control of market shares on a regional or worldwide basis and
for extending protection to a wider array of products. All these types of
measures adversely affect developing country exporters; quantitative re-
strictions and market sharing agreements limit their sales in industrialized
countries directly, while subsidies to weak industries do so indirectly.1
6
In the area of private investment and capital flow, debt service
problems restrict the possibilities for a number of nations." 7 In any
case, future cooperation in this area is still largely outside the realm of
influence of U.S. policy makers. As one American expert in Latin
America recently noted:
In a curious sense, it is much easier for the U.S. Government to manage
its relations with the Soviet Union or China than with Chile or Peru.
Latin American and Caribbean countries are very strongly influenced by
decisions taken by Exxon, United Brands, or Chase Manhattan, to name
just a few examples. And some of the main problems in Inter-American
relations- especially access to capital and technology-are issues over
which the U.S. Government has considerably less influence than nongov-
ernmental actors.118
115 WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, supra note 5, at 14.
116 id
117 Latin American Hearings, supra note 33, at 61 (statement by Albert Fishlow). Fishlow con-
tended:
The amount of external foreign debt is significant and could constrain future growth. At
present all publicly guaranteed loans total $80 billion. Brazil and Mexico alone together
constitute nearly 25% of all outstanding developing country public debt. Service payments on
debts now account for 40% of export receipts for Latin America as a whole; for large debtors
like Brazil and Mexico, the percentage is even higher.
id
118 Lowanthal, supra note 27, at 122.
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Second, significant new breakthroughs in these areas would not
necessarily constitute an adequate response to Latin America's key de-
velopment problems. Increases in trade and capital flows will merely
serve to channel increased resources into Latin American economies
that, in a number of cases, lack the implementing mechanisms or pro-
gram frameworks to channel those additional resources to the poor.
Without internal policy changes and the formulation of new develop-
ment programs, such actions can be expected to benefit, in many cases,
the upper and middle classes and not the vast majority that is poor.
For this reason, trade concessions, private investment, or commercial
capital flows cannot entirely substitute for carefully designed programs
that directly attack the problems of the poor or that provide innovative
solutions to as yet unaddressed second-generation development
problems.
While multilateral development bank flows play a vital and ex-
tremely positive role in the hemisphere's development, here too are
limits on the extent to which they will or can adequately address key
problems, especially the region's massive poverty. Despite changes in
multilateral development bank rhetoric regarding the desirability of
targeting economic assistance directly at the poorest sections of LDCs,
a recently completed study found that in 1977 only about twenty per-
cent of World Bank and Inter-American Development Bank flows were
for projects which primarily provided direct benefits to low income
groups." 9 Most of the funds went for needed infrastructure projects or
large scale industrial and agricultural projects. While unquestionably
the multilateral banks are making greater efforts to develop projects
that will benefit lower income groups, they face several disadvantages
in this effort. They do not have the field staff structure necessary to
identify and work with local reform groups on a continuing basis, as is
often necessary in pursuing a basic human needs approach to develop-
ment. The need to raise a large portion of their loanable funds on in-
ternational capital markets gives impetus to the belief that a large
portion of their projects should have relatively low risk and positive
rates of financial return, which may not be characteristic of innovative
approaches to reducing poverty or addressing second-generation
problems. Also, at least in the past, some multilateral institutions have
seen their role as one of responding to sound project requests by mem-
ber governments rather than encouraging new development initiatives
in specific areas.
119 Effectiveness of the World Bank, supra note 113, at 90.
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A NEw STRATEGY FOR U.S. ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO LATIN
AMERICA
Given the limitations on other resource flows to middle-income
countries, U.S. foreign aid has great potential for fostering creative so-
lutions to the complex, global economic problems which confront an
increasingly interdependent world. United States bilateral economic
and technical cooperation in Latin America, however, is not currently
designed as a resource transfer program. Its primary role is to transfer
ideas and technical knowledge, in order to build indigenous capacity to
analyze and deal with poverty and newer global problems. AID's
small loan projects, such as integrating research, training, technical
assistance, institution-building, management systems, and modest capi-
tal inputs, matched by local contributions, create the "absorptive ca-
pacity" so that host countries can better deal with their critical
development problems.
What is advocated here is a creative new mechanism for U.S. de-
velopment cooperation. This proposal seeks neither the large capital
transfers of the 1960's nor the simple technical assistance programs of
the post-war era. Nor are billions of public dollars needed to accom-
plish the job that free trade and investment can do. What is necessary,
instead, is a careful blend of modest development loans and technical
cooperation that will enable Latin America to foster the institutions, to
nurture the human resources, and to support the necessary policies in
order to deal with the widespread poverty and second generation devel-
opment problems already discussed.
United States bilateral economic assistance can play a constructive
role in middle-income countries by:
(1) providing expertise to help the middle-income countries make the
most of their own development efforts;
(2) serving as a catalyst for encouraging host countries to channel in-
creased domestic resources to critical problem areas;
(3) creating the structures to institutionalize capabilities and creating
constituencies for desirable types of programs;
(4) developing new delivery systems and new technologies for better
serving the poor, and
(5) providing politically acceptable "risk capital" for innovative pro-
grams and helping to finance the short-run costs of reform programs.
What is needed to accomplish these objectives is a flexible program
with modestly increased funding that is targeted on poverty alleviation
and solutions of second generation development problems, especially
as they interrelate. This program would attempt to advance the body
of knowledge of the United States about how to solve development
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problems in middle-income countries and would create or strengthen
structures, capabilities, and policies to achieve this end.
In allocating assistance to all countries, the United States should
take account of the commitment of local governments to U.S. goals or
expected advancement in commitment which a particular program ap-
pears likely to foster. All bilateral programs should be carried out in
the closest possible coordination with the multinational banks in the
expectation that many successful bilateral programs might be repli-
cated by the banks on a much larger scale after these programs had
been tested, the groundwork had been laid, and local constituencies
created or enlarged by U.S. bilateral efforts.
In this regard, it is important to note the establishment of the In-
ternational Development Cooperation Agency (IDCA). IDCA came
into existence pursuant to Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1979120 and the
implementing Executive Order, effective October 1, 1979.121 As the
agency having primary responsibility for establishing overall develop-
ment assistance policies and for international development activities
supported by the United States, and as the agency concerned with
trade, investment, science and technology, and other economic matters
significantly affecting the developing.nations, IDCA appears to be the
type of vehicle necessary to coordinate future U.S. bilateral programs
with the multilateral development banks and to implement the ideas
expressed in this article.
Another noteworthy development has been the enactment of sec-
tion 125 of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979.122
This new section, incorporated into the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961,123 reads as follows:
It is the sense of the Congress that the United States should place greater
emphasis on public and private resources for development programs in
Latin America and the Caribbean which address problems common to
the Western Hemisphere. It is further the sense of the Congress that pro-
vision of such assistance to Latin American and Caribbean countries, in-
cluding transitional developing countries, is consistent with the purposes
of part I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.124
This section represents three congressional views: first, that the
120 Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1979, 125 Cong. Rec. H2188 (H. Doc. No. 96-94), reprintedin
[1979] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. News 850.
121 Exec. Order No. 12,147, reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 42,957 (1979).
122 International Development Cooperation Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-53, § 125, 93 Stat. 395
(1979).





levels of assistance to Western Hemisphere nations should not be re-
duced merely because some of them are classified as middle-income or
transitional nations; second, that assistance levels should be increased
in order to avoid a situation whereby the U.S. bilateral assistance pro-
gram would become a net drain on some hemisphere economies be-
cause these levels would be exceeded by loan repayments; and third,
that increased assistance should be directed toward the alleviation of
common regional problems.
Concerning the first issue, the House Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs noted that the use of the term "middle-income" to describe a
Latin American or Caribbean nation or a focus on per capita income
are inappropriate indicia because they ignore such factors as the ineq-
uitable distribution of income and the dual national economies, both
traditional and modern, which often exist side-by-side within the same
country. Per capita income figures inadequately express the fact that
almost half of the Western Hemisphere's population does not have suf-
ficient income to satisfy their basic human needs.125 Therefore, accord-
ing to the Committee, assistance should not be reduced to these
countries, but increased.' 26
With respect to the second matter, there is concern in Congress
that the reduction in the proportion of U.S. assistance for Latin
America and the Caribbean to all overall assistance levels, combined
with repayment from the Hemisphere of past loans, has led to a sharp
decrease in the net transfer of funds from the United States to Latin
America and the Caribbean. Unless assistance levels are increased, this
may result in a net drain to the economies of some Western Hemi-
sphere nations. This would be contrary to the intent of Congress.
127
Noting common Western Hemisphere problems, the House Committee
stated that it wished to emphasize the necessity for addressing these
problems on a regional basis and the fact that U.S. self-interests will be
served through assistance to other Western Hemisphere nations.
128
While it remains to be seen what impact section 125 will have,
Congress has certainly laid the foundation for possible increases in
funding for development programs in Latin America. At a time when
the United States is facing new political challenges in Central America
and the Eastern Caribbean, this new language should accelerate the
125 AUTHORIZATION, APPROPRIATION-INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COOPERATION ACT
OF 1979, H.R. REP. No. 96-79, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 29 (1979), reprinted in [1979] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 1803.
126 Id
127 Id at 28.
128 Id
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incremental increases in assistance to Latin America that have occurred
since 1977 and, indeed, it appears that there may well be significant
increases for the Hemisphere countries in the fiscal year 1981 budget.
Notwithstanding the above, current political and economic reali-
ties in the United States compel a recognition that U.S. tax dollars will
not be sufficient to finance the ambitious foreign aid program described
above. Even if present U.S. government belt-tightening and congres-
sional restrictions on foreign aid do not result in a lower foreign aid
budget, and even if funds provided in the foreign aid budget can be
reallocated toward the middle income countries, U.S. governmental re-
sources would still fall short of needs.
The 1980's requires a new collaborative development effort be-
tween governments and private lenders throughout the hemisphere.
The U.S. government can no longer be, nor should it be, the main sup-
plier of large capital transfers for the hemisphere. That essential role
belongs to the natural flow of trade and investment among neighbors.
Therefore, a new strategy for U.S. foreign aid to middle-income coun-
tries should embrace the concept of a mechanism for blending private
capital and U.S. government aid to co-financing packages that target
loans to projects which address critical development problems. An
otherwise modest transfer of bilateral economic assistance, coupled
with the larger and growing flow of private capital and technology, can
have an impact far beyond its apparent size.
The blending of public and private sector resources may be the
only means available for substantially expanding the flow of capital to
important development projects while still maintaining a very neces-
sary degree of concessionality. Concessional aid provides the "seed
capital" and incentives required for pioneering new development ap-
proaches and adapting new technologies that often cannot be done with
other funding sources. The type of poverty and social sector projects
that are most necessary often require some form of concessional financ-
ing. For these projects, host governments may require loans with re-
payment periods of twenty or more years, and less than full commercial
interest rates. 129 The blending of concessional funds of AID with long-
term commercial loans-on a one-to-one basis-might provide the nec-
essary degree of concessionality to better support these governments
that want to expand their programs for meeting the basic human needs
of all their citizens as well as other development objectives.
130
There already is precedent for a new mechanism of public-private
129 See note 3 supra.
130 See, e.g., Economic and Military Assistance Hearings, supra note 83, at 28.
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sector cooperation in the hemisphere. In the 1960's, AID helped estab-
lish, throughout Central and South America and the Caribbean, local
private development banks (Financieras) that quickly became impor-
tant borrowers in U.S. capital markets. Local host governments with
their own resources and AID capital assistance built and expanded the
Central American Bank for Economic Integration (CABEI), the Carib-
bean Development Bank (CDB), and the Andean Development Corpo-
ration (ADC). These institutions have evolved into significant new
mechanisms for channeling private capital to areas that support re-
gional development and integration.
AID also has provided loans so that the Latin American Agribusi-
ness Development Corporation (LAAD) could direct private U.S. capi-
tal, new management, and technologies to Central American and
Caribbean agribusiness enterprises. Yet the best model for creating a
new development lending instrument for the 1980's could be based on
AID's successful Housing Investment Guarantee (HIG) Program.
Through this program AID develops with host countries high priority
housing projects. AID then helps to protect, through U.S. Government
guaranties, and to target private capital to these projects and to the
housing sectors of many Latin and Caribbean countries. The success of
the HIG program is evidenced by the fact that less than one percent of
the private sector loans, guaranteed thereunder, have ever been in de-
fault. Since the inception of this program, more than $1.0 billion of
guaranties have been authorized to be issued, and $700 million of this
authorized amount is presently outstanding. Moreover, since the early
1960's when the Latin American savings and loan industry was virtu-
ally non-existent, the HIG program has been an integral factor in caus-
ing that industry to grow to its present size, with assets in excess of $20
billion. 13' A similar instrument could direct private lending capital to
other priority development projects and coordinate that capital with a
renewed U.S. government development effort in the Western Hemi-
sphere.
In considering private sector participation in this new develop-
ment effort, the excellent record that Latin American and Caribbean
countries have had in repaying U.S. loans should be taken into ac-
count. Of the more than 500 U.S. bilateral development loans privided
to governments during the past 20 years, none have ever been written-
131 See generally Christian, Around the World in Twenty Years, J. NAT'L SAVINGS & LOAN
LEAGUE, Nov. 1977, at 15.
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off or lost. 32 Such a record gives confidence that Latin American de-
velopment projects can be a safe investment.
Private loans, combined with AID's concessional resources, could
be directed to development projects like the following:
(1) small farmer credit and other rural development programs that will
build a strong, stable agricultural sector to support industrialization
as well as nurturing further capital investment;
(2) health and nutrition programs that improve the quality of life and
the economic productivity of both the rural and urban poor;
(3) education and job training for the poor to give them a place and a
stake in economic growth, and make for more investment opportuni-
ties;
(4) create and expand small industries and agribusiness that increase
employment opportunities and serve as training grounds for future
entrepreneurs;
(5) local urban governments and rural municipalities so that they could
better serve the needs of their poor and contribute to the building of
local democratic traditions; or
(6) the development of science and technology, for making possible nat-
ural resource conservation and environmental improvements, and
for developing alternative energy resources that will make possible-
and profitable-the next generation of private investment.
CONCLUSION
Although the discussion in this article has focused on Latin
America and the Caribbean, the policy proposals pertain to all middle-
income countries. In an increasingly interdependent world, LDC's
should not be abandoned once they have achieved a per capita income
level beyond some arbitrarily specified point. United States self-inter-
est and global welfare require a continuing effort to address the devel-
opment problems of the middle-income countries. More than ever
before the countries of the world share a common destiny. The chal-
lenge of the 1980's is to maintain and accelerate the economic develop-
ment achievements realized over the past few decades. A flexible and
innovative foreign aid program is imperative in order for the United
States to meet the challenge. As recognized by Congress in section 125
of the 1979 Foreign Assistance Act of 1976,133 the "transitional devel-
oping countries" are at a critical stage of development. Without suffi-
cient and effective support from the multi-lateral institutions, the
private sector, and the donor countries, these transitional developing
132 See Bureau of Latin American and Caribbean Affairs, Agency for International Develop-
ment, A Statement of Loan Implementation and Disbursement Progress Monthly 14 (Jan. 1980).




countries, or middle-income countries, will revert to their previous
LDC status.
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Oil Exporters 6,310 7.0
112 Saudi Arabia 8.6 2,150 4,480 7.0
113 Libya 2.5 1,760 6,310 10.2
114 Kuwait 1.1 18 15,480 -3.0
Centrally Planned
Economies 2,280 3.5
410115 China, People's Rep. 835.8 9,597
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116 Korea, Dem. Rep. 16.3 121 470 3.5
117 Albania 2.5 29 540 4.5
118 Cuba 9.5 115 860 -0.4
119 Mongolia 1.5 1,565 860 1.0
120 Hungary 10.6 93 2,280 3.0
121 Bulgaria 8.8 111 2,310 4.6
122 USSR 256.7 22,402 2,760 3.8
123 Poland 34.3 313 2,860 4.1
124 Czechoslovakia 14.9 128 3,840 2.6
125 German Dem. Rep. 16.8 108 4,220 3.2
SOURCE: THE WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1978, at 76-77 (1978).
